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Georgia Personal Injury Practice book manuscript completed

Wednesday, December 23rd, 2009

This morning at 8:58 AM, I completed writing my book, Georgia Personal Injury Practice. It's been like a mouse giving birth to an elephant.

This morning I will email the chapters to my editor at West Publishing, a division of Thomson Reuters. Undoubtedly there will be much work in the editing process.  But if all goes according to plan, sometime before summer, it should be published.

It is finished.

Merry Christmas!

 

  

Ken Shigley, an Atlanta attorney, launched the first law firm web site in Georgia in 1996, and the second lawyer blog in the state. He is a national board member of the Interstate Trucking Litigation Group. His practice focuses on representing people who are catastrophically injured, and families of those killed, primarily in commercial trucking and bus accidents. Mr. Shigley also has extensive experience representing parties in  products liability, catastrophic personal injury, wrongful death, brain injury, spinal cord injury and burn injury cases. He is a Certified Civil Trial Advocate of the National Board of Trial Advocacyhas been listed as a "Super Lawyer" (Atlanta Magazine), in the Bar Register of Preeminent Lawyers (Martindale), and among the "Legal Elite" (Georgia Trend Magazine).

Mr. Shigley is currently unopposed as a candidate for president-elect, of the 41,000 member State Bar of Georgia, of which he has served as secretary and treasurer.

 For criteria to be considered in selecting an attorney, see The Smart Consumer's Guide to Hiring a Great Lawyer.

4,000 years of “tort reform”

Saturday, December 5th, 2009

As an Atlanta trial attorney representing folks who are badly hurt in interstate commercial trucking accidents, and the survivors of those who are killed, I spend a lot of my time flying around the country to take depositions of trucking company executives and truck drivers, and briefing issues under federal motor carrier safety law. It's a specialized practice area that a lot of folks don't even realize exists.

But in the midst of the "pick and ax" work of litigation, sometimes it's good to step back and look at the tort law system in historical perspective. Some folks who push hardest  to cut off the rights of folks who are hurt badly due to someone else's carelessness seem to think that this whole area of law sprung up in the past generation.

But the roots go back 4,000 years.

The story of  tort law begins around 2100 B.C. in ancient Sumeria, the birthplace of Abraham, in the area of the Tigris-Euphrates delta in present day southern Iraq and Kuwait.   Much as later American tort law would emphasize business, insurance, motor vehicles and manufactured products, Sumerian laws focused on their context, including pragmatic rules for orderly compensation supplanting the instinct for uncontrolled revenge.  The Laws of Ur-Nammu (c. 2112–2085 B.C.)  mandated compensation in silver for putting out a man’s eye, and the Code of Lipit-Ishtar (c. 1934-1924 BC) set a negligence standard for property damage to a house.  The Sumerian city-state of Eshnunna developed a legal code (c. 1900 B.C.), that expanded upon these principles of compensation for damages done to another, addressing conflicts over sunken boats, gored oxen, biting dogs and  collapsing walls.

A couple of centuries later, upstream in the Tigris-Euphrates river valley,  Sumerian laws become the foundation of the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700 BC).  Included were early versions of the principal features of tort liability – intentional tort, negligence, strict liability, indirect causation, fixed versus variable compensation, notice, knowledge, objective standards for conduct, monetary compensation for private harms, and perhaps even contributory negligence. 

When Moses led the Hebrews out of Egyptian slavery (circa 1440 B.C. -  1290 B.C.), the Mosaic laws included echoes of Sumeria (father Abraham's hometown) and Hammurabi.  The Torah is filled with what we think of as 'tort' rules, indicating the depth of the roots of tort law in the Judeo-Christian tradition.  Precursors of tort law in the Pentateuch include the spreading fire, the straying livestock, the uncovered pit, the bull goring another bull (property damage), the bull goring humans (personal injury), the injunction to maintain a railing around one’s roof, compensation for  accidental injury of one man by another swinging an ax, and that one man quarreling with and injuring another man must pay the wages of the injured man until he recovers.

A thousand years after Hammurabi, the legal system of ancient Greece began to emerge. The emphasis was on  fairness and integrity of judges more than the specifics of rules and doctrine, as judges were chosen by the parties much as private mediators and arbitrator are chosen today.  However, running through is a growing preference for resolving disputes through just compensation rather than the bloody retribution and feuds of old. Principles of corrective justice emerged. 

Plato in The Laws wrote of "little repeated torts between neighbors" for which there was strict liability to others for either personal harm or invasion of property, and awards of a multiple of pecuniary damages for “churlish” conduct.  Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics taught the rectification of marginal inequality created by involuntary transactions in which either an intentional act or an unintentional “mistake” – equivalent to concept of negligence in modern tort law – causes foreseeable injury.  The amount of inequality to be rectified was the the community's valuation the physical injury due to the defendant's wrongful act.  Customary Greek law was first codified by Dracon, circa 622 B.C., with penalties so harsh as to give us the word draconian and as to require reform within a generation. By 594 B.C., Salon was given a year to reform the Athenian constitution, legal code and law courts. Under the Code of Salon, juries of as many as 500 members determined both fault and penalties, a spectacle against which those who distrust modern juries would surely recoil.

Early Roman law was simple and pragmatic, arising from an agrarian culture thrust into a role of economic and military dominance.  The disparate sources of customary laws were codified initially on ten wooden panels around 889 B.C. by a panel of ten patrician jurists (Decemvirs), into the “Ten Tables,” later expanded by 450 B.C. to the “Twelve Tables.” Private wrongs were called "delicts." The penalty for intentional homicide was blood vengeance at the election of the victim’s family, while for an unintentional homicide payment of a prescribed number of cattle or a ram (scapegoat) for ritual sacrifice by the victim’s family.  For accidental personal injury there was often an election between retaliation in kind or a specified payment. Delicts addressing various categories of property damage required two or three times the amount of actual pecuniary loss.

The Twelve Tables were replaced by the Lex Aquila, enacted by popular plebiscite circa 286 B.C.  While preserving the general rule of strict liability for one’s actions, the Lex Aquila introduced elements of fault and negligence. To encourage truthfulness, willful denial of a meritorious claim could result in doubling of the damages awarded.  The Lex Cornelia ( c. 67 B.C.) adjusted monetary remedies upward to account for four centuries of inflation since adoption of the Twelve Tables.

Throughout Rome’s thousand year dominance, its laws were continually reformed, refined, and influenced by legal scholars, culminating in the Justinian Code. Except for the limitations inherent in a class-conscious, patriarchal society heavily dependent on a slave economy, Roman law provided the foundation for civil remedies for personal injury, including (1) money damages as the dominant remedy in resolving civil disputes; (2) the identification of instances in which strict liability for the consequences of one's actions might not apply, such as in the instance of action not voluntarily taken; (3)  transparency in judicial decision making as Praetors were required pronounce the law they would apply; and (4) judicial discretion to determine when strict application of legal rules, or the absence of rules and remedies, would produce a manifestly unjust outcome.

Over thousands of years, these early foundations of tort law led to the development of English common law and our American tort law system.  This body of law has been in the process of reforming to meet the changing needs and conditions of western civilization for 5,000 years.

Sometimes the pendulum swings too far in one direction or another, and when that happens, lawmakers and judges tug it back toward the middle of the path. Fortunately, we have some legislators in both parties who understand the issues in enough depth to make wise choices rather than being consumed in the urgency of political sausage making while struggling with the immediacy of budget problems and the cacophony of interest group demands. Some of  the folks who beat the drums loudest for "tort reform" go too far, sometimes out of a desire to generate political campaign contributions from particular interests. But some ideas in the "tort reform" area can have merit if applied fairly and in moderation.

Over time, despite the excesses on the margins, the path of development of personal injury law tends to be consistent with Georgia's state motto: "Wisdom, Justice, Moderation."

 

 

Ken Shigley, an Atlanta attorney, is a national board member of the Interstate Trucking Litigation Group. His practice focuses on representing people who are catastrophically injured, and families of those killed, primarily in commercial trucking and bus accidents. Mr. Shigley also has extensive experience representing parties in  products liability, catastrophic personal injury, wrongful death, brain injury, spinal cord injury and burn injury cases. He is a Certified Civil Trial Advocate of the National Board of Trial Advocacyhas been listed as a "Super Lawyer" (Atlanta Magazine), among the "Legal Elite" (Georgia Trend Magazine), and in the Bar Register of Preeminent Lawyers (Martindale).  Currently he is treasurer, and unopposed as a candidate for president-elect, of the 41,000 member State Bar of Georgia.

 For criteria to be considered in selecting an attorney, see The Smart Consumer's Guide to Hiring a Great Lawyer.

Georgia Supreme Court holds that defendant’s delay in resolving traffic charges extends plaintiff’s time to file suit

Tuesday, September 29th, 2009

As an Atlanta trial attorney representing people seriously injured in traffic crashes, I seldom advise procrastination in filing suit as cases seldom improve with age. However, there are exceptions.

Yesterday, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the two years statute of limitation for personal injury is ("tolled") until the traffic court case against the person at fault is concluded.

That means that the two year clock doesn't start running until the traffic charge arising from an auto accident is disposed of, one way or another, in court. I have seen cases where the traffic charges languished on court dockets for as much as four years. In those instances, the injury victim could have up to six years to file suit rather than only two.

And defendants who manage to stall resolution of their prosecutions for serious traffic offenses do so at the risk of extending the time in which they can be sued.

A Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99, says the statute of limitations for any tort action a victim brings over an alleged crime is tolled from the date of the alleged crime until the prosecution of the crime becomes final or is terminated, as long as that time does not exceed six years.

The Supreme Court held that “the plain language of OCGA § 9-3-99 would encompass a violation of a Uniform Rule of the Road. To impose a more stringent definition of 'crime' within the context of the statute would render superfluous its language that the statute of limitation is tolled from the date of the alleged crime 'or the act giving rise to such action in tort' until the prosecution or other termination of such crime 'or act.'”

Chief Justice Hunstein wrote that the court had to reach the result it did notwithstanding the significant impact the decision will have. “If the Legislature had intended to limit the application of OCGA § 9-3-99 to tort actions arising from only certain types of crimes, e.g., felonies or specific intent crimes, it certainly could have done so. It did not, and any undesirable result is a matter properly addressed by the General Assembly rather than the courts.”

I would not generally advise such delay in filing suit or taking a case to trial. If a felony traffic charge is pending against the defendant, it can be a tactical advantage for the plaintiff if the defendant repeatedly invokes the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination in front of the jury in the civil trial, and the judge then instructs the jury that they may infer that a truthful answer would not have helped the defendant.

And delay can often result in loss of evidence and witnesses' loss of memory.

More and more, I'm inclined to file suit promptly when the injury is clearly catastrophic, and move aggressively to complete necessary investigation and discovery.

However, when people do wander in late, or where it is essential to compel answers to questions in disvoery, yesterday's court decision allows us one more arrow in the quiver.

Following is a copy of the Georgia Supreme Court unanimous decision

---------------------------------------------------------

 

Benke v. Parker

Nos. S08G2078, S08G2082

Sept. 28, 2009.


HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.


1.On April 27, 2005, Patricia Parker was injured when the car in which she was a passenger was struck from the rear and overturned by a vehicle driven by Alan Beneke; Beneke was cited for following too closely. See OCGA § 40-6-49. Parker filed a personal injury action against Beneke on May 11, 2007. The trial court initially granted Beneke's motion for summary judgment based on the expiration of the two-year statute of limitation, see OCGA § 9-3-33, but on motion for reconsideration vacated its order and denied summary judgment. In finding that the complaint was timely-filed because the statute of limitation had been tolled until Beneke posted a cash bond disposing of the traffic citation on May 19, 2005, the trial court relied on OCGA § 9-3-99, which provides that

[t]he running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime committed in this state shall be tolled from the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years.

Ineneke v. Parker, 293 Ga.App. 186 (667 S.E.2d 97) (2008), the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment, but vacated the portion of the trial court's order ruling that Beneke had committed a “crime” as a matter of law so as to bring OCGA § 9-3-99 into play, holding that this question must be resolved by a jury. See Beneke, supra at 189-190(1). We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a “crime” within the context of OCGA § 9-3-99 must be a “crime” that satisfies the definition set forth in OCGA § 16-2-1(a),N1i.e., one that involves criminal intent or criminal negligence. For the reasons that follow, we hold that it did so err.

FN1. OCGA § 16-2-1(a) provides that “[a] ‘crime’ is a violation of a statute of this state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence.”


[T]he fundamental rules of statutory construction ... require us to construe a statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. [Cits.] At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature. [Cit.]
 Slakman v. Continental Casualty Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 (587 S.E.2d 24) (2003). A violation of one of the Uniform Rules of the Road, such as the rule that a driver must not follow another vehicle too closely, is a misdemeanor, OCGA § 40-6-1(a), and a misdemeanor is “any crime other than a felony.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-1-3(9). Thus, the plain language of OCGA § 9-3-99 would encompass a violation of a Uniform Rule of the Road. To impose a more stringent definition of “crime” within the context of the statute would render superfluous its language that the statute of limitation is tolled from the date of the alleged crime “or the act giving rise to such action in tort” until the prosecution or other termination of such crime “or act.”
 
2 The Court of Appeals properly affirmed the denial of summary judgment to Beneke. However, no factual determination need be made as to whether Beneke acted with criminal intent or criminal negligence, i.e., whether his violation of OCGA § 40-6-49 constituted a crime as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1(a), in order to apply OCGA § 9-3-99 here. We thus reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding otherwise. Like the Court of Appeals, we recognize that our holding in this case will have a significant impact on personal injury actions arising out of vehicle accidents by tolling the statute of limitation in those situations where a traffic citation is issued. See Beneke, supra, 293 Ga.App. at 191. Nonetheless, we are constrained by the language of the statute to reach this result. If the Legislature had intended to limit the application of OCGA § 9-3-99 to tort actions arising from only certain types of crimes, e.g., felonies or specific intent crimes, it certainly could have done so. It did not, and any undesirable result is a matter properly addressed by the General Assembly rather than the courts.

 Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
 
 

All the Justices concur

 
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Ken Shigley is an attorney in Atlanta, Georgia, whose practice focuses on representing people who are catastrophically injured, and families of those killed. Mr. Shigley has extensive experience representing parties in trucking and bus accidents, products liability, catastrophic personal injury, wrongful death, brain injury, spinal cord injury and burn injury cases. He is a Certified Civil Trial Advocate of the National Board of Trial Advocacy,  and has been listed as a "Super Lawyer" (Atlanta Magazine), among the "Legal Elite" (Georgia Trend Magazine), and in the Bar Register of Preeminent Lawyers (Martindale).  Currently he is treasurer of the 41,000 member State Bar of Georgia and a national board member of the American Association for Justice Interstate Trucking Litigation Group.

 For criteria to be considered in selecting an attorney, see The Smart Consumer's Guide to Hiring a Great Lawyer.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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